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During the age of great revolutions, Joseph de Maistre distinguished between
counter revolutions and the contraries of revolutions. Fearing, rightly, that counter
revolutions may have the same horrible consequences as the Jacobinism that
he witnessed, he expressed his preference for the contrary of revolutions, but
never really explained how it would work. If we take the Bolshevik type revolutions
of 1917 and after as the baseline, the self limiting, velvet, peaceful, negotiated
revolutions, “refolutions” or “reforradalmak” of 1989, 1990 and in South Africa a bit
later supplied the answer. Where there were previously dictatorships linked to party
or parliamentary sovereignty, or their combination, they established constitutional
democracies through round table led negotiations, and legal continuity. The legal
continuity  itself rested in part on the fiction that the previous regimes had real law,
and in part on the possibility that part of that fiction, and in particular the amendment
rule of constitutions (Art 15 (3) in Hungary originally) could be turned into workable
mechanisms.
The problem De Maistre articulated returns if we take the negotiated revolutions
or changes of regime as our revolutionary baseline. Those who  wish to reverse
the outcome, namely constitutional democracy, always had a choice: break with all
white gloved legality and establish a new regime of their choice through revolutionary
rupture, or use the mechanisms of constitutional democracy to abolish the very
system according to what Goebbels already considered the best joke about
democracy. Again the choice: contre-revolution or le contraire de la revolution. In
Hungary only a fascinating figure like István Csurka, whose spirit was hardened
under the name Rasputin in the service of the old ministry of the interior was inclined
to the old counter revolutionary  scenario; I doubt that his children in Jobbik are
involved in more than elaborate political theater.  But be that as it may, Viktor Orbán,
far more clever than any of them chose to do both things at once, in watered down
versions.   Verbally he is a full fledged revolutionary, if only on well chosen occasions
when for example he decides to rename an otherwise identical sitting parliament as
the national constituent assembly (alkotmányozó nemzetgy#lés).  Legally, he follows
the plan of a contrary revolution, based on the open ended normal parliamentary
amending process of the constitution he seeks to replace.  In reality, much more
than the constitution of the regime change of 1989-1990, his proposal is simply full
of continuities with the regime that he dishonestly claims has never had validity in
his eyes: the same branches of power, the same parliamentary system with an only
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slightly altered constructive vote of no confidence, a reduced, dramatically packed
(11 to 15) but still potentially strong constitutional court (even if not for the current
session when the new form of prior review will be useless), a system of 2/3 laws
that was a unique aspect of just that regime, and a presidency elected more or less
the same way. Admittedly these are kept next to new elements that will make his
particular governmental incumbency, Pinochet style, extend its life into the future
through special appointments, and a somewhat deformed existing table of rights. 
More dramatic ideas like a second corporate chamber, vdouble voting for mothers
with children, and the creation of a new amendment rule are however  abandoned.
 All in all I hold my view that masquerading as a new constitution Orban’s basic
law is only a bizarrely put together amendment package that, despite vocal claims
and exclusionary symbolic elements noisily advertising total transformation of the
regime’s identity, earn him only the title, to use an American expression: “chicken
shit revolutionary”.
But people should have the right to name themselves and their revolution.  Orbán
and Szájer, both of whom I have the misfortune of personally knowing,  are
according to their own designation “revolutionaries of the voting booth”,  a curious
addition to the vocabulary of the many handsome Central European qualifiers of
the substantive, revolution. This absurd construction once again recalls the words
of the master: “the first time tragedy, the second time farce”.  Alas, a farce can last
politically and institutionally for 20 years as it did in the case of Louis Napoleon
(longer in fact than the tragedy of the uncle).  The farcical combination of the rhetoric
of revolution, and the utilization of not only constitutional contents but the very
method of continuity from 1989, denuded of its normatively attractive elements,
can succeed even if people realize the possible contradiction (they have not yet)
of denouncing the current legal validity of the 1989-1990 constitution, and using its
amendment rule to enact a new one that contains the very same amendment rule.
This contradiction can only be removed if we admit also that the 1989-1990
constitution was itself a full break with its predecessor, a new and fully democratic
  rule of law constitution.  That is logically quite possible within the method of
continuity, a point of H.L.A. Hart versus Kelsen that I will not try to formally revisit
here. It is more true for the constitution of 1989-1990, than of the new construction
that is about to be passed, irrespective of the formal absence of the 1949 label. 
And indeed,  if the regime of 1989-1990 was a new one, why should there be a new
revolution organized against it?  No one in Europe wants to say that he or she is
a counter or contrary revolutionary against the constitutional state, accept maybe
Jobbik and its ilk elsewhere. It is on this point however that the historical omissions
of the liberal side have helped Orban make his case, if not first and foremost in
terms of revolutionary or even soft revolutionary rhetorics. At issue is the unfinished
nature of the Hungarian regime change, or negotiated revolution.   The commentary
FIDESZ appends at the end of its constitutional proposal is right to point this out,
even if the concept of finishing a constitutionally incomplete regime change, within
legal continuity, is not the same as reversing it through any kind of revolution,
contrary or counter, legal or illegal.  What I am interested in is not only how the
enterprise of current constitution making is justified, indeed how three contradictory
arguments or rhetorics are inorganically combined . Rather, I would like to maintain,
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that the one valid argument among the three that FIDESZ martials in its own defense
indicates how the door was left open to its current constitution making effort by the
defenders of the constitution of 1989-1990. They are therefore in significant part
responsible for what is happening now.
What I am saying, horribile dictu, is that on one point FIDESZ is right, as against its
liberal critics. The latter still claim, with an expression known only to the Hungarian
semi-professional literature, that there is no constitution making compulsion or
“alkotmányozási kényszer” in Hungary. I find and always found the very term
incredibly irritating (along with another one indicating that middle strong amendment
rules “cast the constitution in concrete”) , and particularly misleading in Hungary.
  In Hungary there has been constitution making compulsion of some special kind
since 1989, not primarily because of the contents of the Constitution agreed upon at
the Round Table, and especially as corrected in 1990 by amendments, but because
its very preamble refers to its own interim status by indicating its validity till “the
enactment of our country’s new Constitution”. It is useless to interpret Hungary
in terms of the debates of Jefferson and Madison, and side with Madison’s much
more conservative position, because not one of the at least 13 or more constitutions
made in America at the time of that extended debate (at least 11 in the states,
2 for the Federal Union) were made in the way that resembles the Hungarian
process.  The latter belongs to another innovative pattern, beyond the dicothomy
of revolution and reform, pioneered in Spain, practiced in different ways by several
Central European countries and perfected in South Africa, and its very structure
involves a constitution making compulsion between two stages of constitution
making for the sake of learning and legitimacy both.  Hence the similarity of the
openly stated provisional status and the very language of the 1989-1990 Hungarian
constitution to the Polish Little Constitution 1992, the Bulgarian amendment package
1990,  or the South African interim constitution of 1994 was not accidental. It was
generally and entirely correctly recognized that coopted bodies like Round Tables,
whatever their subsidiary legitimacy from other sources (inclusion, consensus,
deliberation, publicity, veil of ignorance regarding specific outcomes) did not have
the full democratic legitimacy based on free elections any more than the parliaments
of the old regimes on which they technically relied on to enact substantively new
final constitutions of the changed regimes. Yet the transitions to democracy had
to already take place under the sign of constitutionalism if the danger of civil
war or revolutionary dictatorship was to be fully averted. The solution was the
interim constitution under various names, and more generally a two stage model of
transformation where after free elections in a second or later stage a freely elected
assembly (constitutional assembly or Grand National Assembly or parliament under
special conditions) would produce the final constitution.  The South Africans rightly
recognized that the best way to do this was for the interim constitution to include
the detailed rules for the making of the final one. This was unfortunately omitted in
Hungary with the very unfortunate consequence that after free elections in 1990 a
pact of just two parties could replace a consensual new constitution making effort at
what would have been the most logical time.
FIDESZ was rightly an early critic of this last procedure, but that did not make it
an opponent of the subsequent 1994-1996 effort.  At that time it was widely felt
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that there was at least a need (if not a compulsion or kenyszer) to re-legitimate
the constitution of the regime change through finally enacting the new promised
constitution. I emphatically do not share the view that the effort was motivated
by the reluctance of the MSZP to accept the constitution of the regime change
that was already fine as it was.  The SZDSZ was even more committed at that
time to making finally a new constitution, and for me at least this was the main
point in entering into the coalition of 1994 – in the end a mistake I participated
in. Mea culpa, especially since the constitution effort failed.  It is true, that while
some people spoke of conservative constitution making at the time , others hoped
for more substantive changes. That is as it should be; this was a legitimate point
for negotiations, unless one side was to impose one or the other. While those in
the minority (including FIDESz) feared a constitutional dictatorship of the MSZP-
SZDSZ supermajority, many of us urged that majority through SZDSZ to adopt
highly generous consensual methods of constitution making. The 4/5 rule modifying
the constitution, requiring that the rules for constitution making be made by 80%
of parliament, the representation of all parties on the relevant committee by parity
and the highly consensual voting rule were the result. FIDESZ was very satisfied
and became one of the most active participants. I admit I did not much like the
rather wooden result that was emerging, and not only because my role in helping
to create an amendment rule was leading to nothing. Nevertheless the product was
consensual and should have been passed. It was not passed because of what Imre
Konya rightly called the little putsch of Gyula Horn against his own party, indeed
expressing impotent resentment against the regime change, that he shared not with
the majority of the MSZP! but with the KDNP and the Small holders Party.
That is when SZDSZ should have left the coalition that it perhaps never should have
entered.   It should have tried to build a new one around defending the democratic
regime change, symbolized by the need of its completion. Instead, by 2002 the
issue was considered dead among most experts. I was alone at a conference
in 2004 trying to remind everyone: the promise is still unkept, and the Damocles
sword hanging over the country should remind them all if my arguments were
insufficient.  What is that sword? Everyone in Hungary was actually aware of it. It is
the combination of the 2/3 amendment rule and the highly disproportional electoral
system.  But that is mixing law and political science, and why should we do that? The
electoral law is not even in the constitution. With the partial exception of G. Halmai
and J. Kis noone gave a damn about my warnings, repeated since the early 90s,
because there was no alkotmányozási kényszer as it was already well known.
The role of people close to Prof. Sólyom is most remarkable in this because they
at least knew and hated the existing amendment rule. A court’s word whatever the
law and its own selfimage say about its finality is not final; it can be trumped by
constitutional amendment. Indeed as Hungarians just discovered, but Americans
and Indians always knew, it is also possible to remove jurisdiction and repass the
same law in the same procedure.  One could even raise the majorities needed
to invalidate laws of parliament as the Turks just found out. The amendment rule
is higher in the judicial hierarchy, and the Hungarian power to amend depended
on contingent and disproportionate electoral outcomes. Everyone knows this
now. I have been saying it for 20 years. People around the CC (AB) too have
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always understood the very simple point, of course. There were two answers
to the dilemma: toughen the amendment rule or begin to review amendments,
and reshift the constitutional hierarchy to the benefit of the CC. (AB) Sólyom was
always for the first option, but amazingly enough thought that  it could be done
by a simple revision of the revision, that in some countries counts as an abuse
and some great thinkers even thought it impossible logically. While these extreme
views are wrong, as a matter of logic, politically for an assembly to tie the hands
of a body just like itself requires a high amount of surplus legitimacy. This is why it
is normally constituent assemblies or conventions or special elected parliaments
with joint sessions or referenda confirmation that wind up doing this job. You revise
the revision in other words in a new constitution making process. But Sólyom and
most of his friends felt there was no need to make a new constitution, because
there was no alkotmányozási kényszer. As Agnes Heller once literally said to
me, don’t bother them, let the Court  make the constitution, it is their job.  While
people near the Court  never said it so crudely, this was their position in essence.
Moreover, they neglected to do this job seriously enough given the threat they well
understood. In spite of Sólyom’s theoretical considerations occasionally articulated
in interviews, and even a very early precedent from 1989, they gradually came
to the conclusion that reviewing amendments under 24 3 is impossible, with the
very absurd pseudo-Kelsenian argument that an amendment is already part of the
constitution so there is nothing to review it against.  Would this also be true in the
case of a procedural flaw in making the amendment? Obviously not. But then, a
substantively unconstitutional amendment that changes what is unchangeable by
definition suffers from a procedural flaw. One cannot change by 2/3 what even 100%
cannot change. A better Kelsenian could have also said that an amendment text was
part only of the document, but of the material constitution only after it has become
legally operative, and that is what a challenge was allowing it to become or not to
become.  Or whatever.  I doubt that the Indian justices who invented the great Basic
Structure doctrine also without eternity clauses to rely on and used amendment
review in posterior, case oriented matters were technically deficient, or inferior to
the Hungarian judges. Learning from them might have stopped not only the removal
of jurisdiction this spring, but also the prima facie unconstitutional act of removing
the art 24 5 requiring 4/5 majority by using 2/3 only. FIDESZ could do these things
already knowing that the Court would do nothing even if it was appealed to (it was
not, also inexplicably, since the second matter was procedural unlike previous
considerations of amendments).  To sum up: the Court played down the need to 
make a new constitution, while implicitly realizing that there was the need to do so,
and gave up the only possible substitute, the one weapon that actually could have
protected the 1989 -1990 constitution including many of its own prerogatives against
subversion by government, namely amendment review.
Given the Court’s failure, FIDESZ nevertheless was in the position of the victors of
1994, against whom it once warned of a possible constitutional dictatorship.  That it
came into the position that it did was the consequence not only of failed policies of
the recent past that gave it the now proverbial 2/3 out of the far less often mentioned
52.7 but
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1. Failures and Omissions of MDF led and MSZP- SZDSZ governments to fulfill
their constitution making responsibilities for 20 years,
2. Failure of the Constitutional Court to help with the constitution making process,
or, if not, then to defend the basic structure of the new regime through
amendment review
3. A general failure of appreciating the heritage of the Round Table that needed to
be completed as elsewhere in the world, not abandoned.
Even with these givens  a resumption of consensual constitution making practice
that was relatively well established in Hungary would have possible and desirable.
Had that happened, FIDESZ could have claimed real credits with respect to
the omissions of the past. Given its weight in parliament, most of its legitimate
constitutional ideas would have had a chance to enter into compromise formulas,
and no idea that it hated could have been approved.  The 4/5 rule did not require
that the same 1995 rules be adopted in any case with many fewer parties including
Jobbik in Parliament, but it required some other set of relatively fair rules.  Abolition
of that rule by 2/3 was not only illegal on the face of it (because a rule like that
would be entirely meaningless if it only said “parliament must do  xyz by 4/5 unless
it chooses to do it by 2/3” ); it was also symbolic of the fact that here a force with
52.7% of the nation’s votes is going to impose a constitution, whether the other half
likes it or not.
It is the glory of the NKA, the National Round Table,  and even of the failed
parliamentary effort of 1994-1996 to have inaugurated a convention for constitution
making, that such an effort can be legitimate only if involving very broad party
agreement  concerning a document that is worthy of enactment. It is this important
tradition that FIDESZ is now violating with devastating consequences for the
cognitive, normative and aesthetic contents of the document..  What was done
is also prima facie illegal, even if noone is in position to go to the Court over the
violation of higher entrenchment, and the Court would most likely turn its face from
such a case.  But the violation has its own consequence. Fidesz cannot produce the
constitutional legitimacy to actually close the constitution making process.  Earlier
they have proposed a version of the Spanish- Dutch (Holland) two parliamentary
session 2/3 rule for future constitutional amendments. As against Hungarian critical
opinion, I argued previously in Népszabadság that this rule taken in isolation is the
only progressive feature of their construct.  Surprisingly, even Cohn Bendit just
claimed that such a rule is absurd and exists nowhere. He should look to Spain
whose two stage differentiated version without an eternity clause , for the record,
I prefer (art 168 dealing with total revision and revision of certain sections that is
apparently on the same level , where moreover referenda are added in addition); and
if not then next door from Brussels to the Netherlands (chapter 8: articles 137-138).
Moreover it is also a convention of the British constitution, if not always entirely
obeyed,  that a constitutional proposal suddenly introduced by a parliament must
receive a mandate in the next election and be also passed by the next parliament.
Yes: the rule is in itself a good one. But it depends on what it seeks to entrench of
course. The critics confuse these two questions. Not entrenching a good constitution
and entrenching a bad one are both bad ideas. The MSZP was however right to
propose to FIDESZ: if you like your new amendment rule proposal so much, why
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don’t you already pass your constitution by two successive parliaments, by 2/3 of
the vote of this and also of the next one, before it is fully enacted.  This was much
preferable to the call for a referendum as Sándor Révész has well argued. Without
answering MSZP or other critics including my humble self, FIDESZ then quietly
dropped the new amendment rule.
So the old 1949 one remains in place, with a different numbering once again,  as
both the living symbol of what will the unfinished nature of the whole job even after
April 2011, or January 2012, and a viable instrument for its immediate continuation
yet again within legal continuity if possible. The job must be indeed be resumed,
by much more serious discussion and public participation than ever before, not by
defending the past, itself marred by elitism often enough, and not by seeking to
restore anything, but by trying to figure out how to allow Hungarians to have finally
a new democratic process and a new democratic constitution that this nation and its
citizens fully deserve. Then and the only then can and must the revision rule be itself
revised, finally completing the process.
So what should we say on April 18, 2011? Forward to a new, legitimate Hungarian
constitution produced by a democratically elected constitutional assembly, under
new, politically consensual, public and participatory rules!  (And we will know of
course that such an assembly if successful will be the final completion of the regime
change that began even before 1989.)
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